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A b s t r act
An experiment ｾ ｳ defined as a random variable which may
take some posterior prpbability d..:i:stributions accordine: to a
marginal probability. '-Elementary properties of this definition
with respect to ｩ ｮ ｦ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ value theory are derived as well
as their practical implications.
*On leave from the Centre d'Ense1gnement Superieur du
ｾ ｡ ｮ ｡ ｧ ･ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ Public, 94112, Arcueil, and from Groupe de Gestion
des Organisations Ecole Poly technique, 75005, Paris, France.
1. Introduction
The concept of the value of information is one of the
cornerstones of Decision Analysis [H, R]. It is ordinarily
presented as a consequence of Bayes' theorem. Now, experiments
may indeed be presented in terms of conditional probabilities,
thus the use of Bayes' theorem, or directly as a random variable
which may take some posterior probability distributions according
to a marginal probability. Equivalence between the two approaches
has long been recognized in the statistics literature (see [B-a])
however the second approach does not seem to have attracted much
theoretical attention from decision analysts in spitl! of some
practical advantages (see example 1.4.3 in [R-S]).
The objective of the paper is to investigate some elementary
properties of this second definition of experiments with respect
to information value theory. The practical significance of these
properties is also studied.
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2. The Value of Information Revisited
2.1 Definitions
Let us first define what shall be referred to as the
classical decision problem.
Definition 2.1.1 The classical decision problem consists
of the selection of an action among a set of feasible actions
A = {a} given a set of possible states of nature 3 = {s}, a
prior probability distribution on S,
P - ips} (ps > 0 L pS = 1)o - 0 SES 0 ' SES 0
and a utility function u (0,.) defined on AXS, with values Ofl
the real line. (A and S are assumed finite).
Experiments with respect to this classical problem may now
be defined in two alternative ways.
Definition 2.1.2 An experiment E, defined in normal forln,
consists of a finite set of possible events E = {e} and a matrix
of conuitional probabilities Q = {qes = Prob {els}}eEE,
ｾ ･ ｦ ｩ ｮ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ 2.1.3 An experiment E, defined in extensive form,
consists cf a finite set of possible events E = {c}, a set of
posterior probability distributions' on S,{Pe = {P:}sss}eEE, and
a ｭ｡ｲｧｾｮ｡ｊ probability distribution on E,
* * * *A = {Ae}eEE A > 0, L A = 1)e
eEE e
wr.ich satisfy fur all SES,
ｾ S sL AePe = Po
eEE
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Both definitions are equivalent in the sense that one may ｾｯ
from one to the other by means of Bayes' theorem.
A classical decision problem and an experiment for this
problem generate what might 'be called a "derived proble'rn" .
(see Chupter 6 in ｛ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ in which one is interested in selecting
thE. bes t s ｴｲ｡ｴ｣ｾｧｹＬ namely an action for each poss ib 1 e event .
....:ol!:paring l'l2rtCtinty equivalents in both ｰ ｲ ｃ ｊ ｢ ｬ ･ ｬ ｦ ｩ ｾ Ｚ ［ and tr'!e Ｈ ［ ｴ ｪ Ｘ ［ ｾ
of the experiment "one then decides whether or not tu carr'y uU 'c
.
. • f •
theexperlIllen t . These practical' cons i<?-erat ions It'ad to the
concept of the ｶ ｡ ｬ ｾ ･ of information.
Let E
s E;3
sp ='lJ
P represents the set of all probabili ty distriLJuti ,jrJe', I.i[l
For all PEP, let u* (0) be the maximal expected utility
associated with the classical decision problem, that is:
..
for' all pe: 1-' , u* (p) = Max E
aEA SES
sp u(a,s)
ｾ ｳ ｳ ｯ ｣ ｩ Ｒ ｴ ･ ､ with an experiment E defined in extensive form may
be expressed as:
EVI'(Pr) -
,J E "A.*u*(p)e e
eEE
?roof: This is a standard result in Decision Analysis. I I
.,
I
J I
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Assuming a linear utility for money, the EVI may be
interpreted as the maximal price at which one should be
willing to buy the experiment.
2.2 Comparing Experiments Defined in Extensive Form
Denote by PE the smallest convex subset of P which
-
contains the vectors {Pe}eEE and for any real valued continuous
function f (0) on P, let Cav f (0) be the minimal concave
PE
function· greater or equal to f (0) on PE' Let EVI (polE)
be the expected value of information associated with the
classical decision problem and an experiment E defined in
extensi ve form.
Proposition 2.2.1
EVI (polE) ｾ Cav u* (p ) - u* (p )
P a a
E
Proof: Denote by (K-l) the dimension of the simplex P. Then
the concavification of the function u*(o) on PE, Cav u* (0),PE
may be obtained by considering all convex combinations of at
most K points in PE which generate PO' Formally we have:
sUbject to:
k=l, ••. ,K
and
, , ,
,
K
E
k=l
A =1k
* g(o) is a concave function on P if and only if for all
Pl and P2 in-P and all AE(O,l):
g,\P1 + Ｈｾ - A)P2) ｾ Ag(Pl) + (1 - A)g(P2)
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Note that u*(e) is a convex function on P as being the point
wise maximum of a set of linear functions on P. ｂ ｵ ｴ ｾ since
PE is the convex hull of the points Ｈ ｐ ･ Ｉ ･ ｅ ｅ ｾ any PkEPE may be
expressed as a convex ｣ ｯ ｭ ｢ ｩ ｮ ｡ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ ｾ say Ｈ ｡ ｫ ･ Ｉ ･ ｅ ｅ ｾ of the points
Ｈ ｐ ･ Ｉ ･ ｅ ｅ ｾ and so for all PkEPE
It follows that
Cav u*(PO) = Max ｾ
PE AEA eEE
in which
A u*(p )
e e
A =. {A = (Ae)eEEIAe > 0 E A = ｬｾ ｾ AeP e = PO}- ｾ eeEE eEE
(clearly the maximum is obtained for some AO in A) .
For any experiment defined in extensive form (see definition
Ｒ Ｎ Ｑ Ｎ Ｓ Ｉ ｾ A* belongs to A. ｔｨｵｳｾ
substracting u*(PO) both ｳ ｩ ､ ･ ｳ ｾ ones gets the proposition. I I
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We shall now charact'erize the experiments for 1t>Jhich (2.2.1)
•
lS in general an equality. Define the P-class of classical
decision problems as all problems for which S and PO in P
remain fixed whereas A and u(O!o) are allowed to vary.
Definition 2.2.2 The experiment E is said to be efficient
if and only if (2.2.1) is an equality for all problems in the
P-class.
Note that the definition is meaningful since in order to
define an experiment associated with a classical decision problem
we need only know S and Po that is, the P-class.
Propositjon ｾ Ｎ Ｒ Ｎ Ｓ An experiment E, defin8d in extcnslVC
form, is efficient if and only if ｴ ｨ ｾ vectors {Pe}eEE are
linearly independent .
•
Proof: Assume that E is inefficient. Then there exists a
classical decision problem in the P-class such that (2.2.1)
is a strict inequality. For this problem there exists a
AO £ A such that (see proposition 2.2.1)
L ａｾ u*(Pe) = Cav u*(PO)
e£E PE
This AO is different from A* because of the strict inequality.
SUbstracting A*P
e e = Po we obtain a
meaningful linear dependence relation between the {p} E
e e£
vectorSl'{Pe} e£E i( using Caratheodory' s theorem), so
set {Pe}e£E is linearly dependent, A contains at
Reciprocally, since Po
{Pe}e£E it may be expressed
independent
that if the
belongs to the convex hull of
as a convex combination of linearly
-7-
least two points. It is now a simple matter to construct a
'.
classical decision problem for which (2.2.1) is a strict
ineQuality. I I
Corollary 2.2.4 An experiment defined in extensive form,
is inefficient if and only if at least one of the following
conditions hold
(i) there exists some elEE such that Pe E PE - {e },1 1
(ii) there are more points in E than in S.
Proof: This is an immediate equivalence of the linear dependency
of the vectors {p }
e ee:E. II
A typical illustration of the first condition is the
is intuitiveThen itcase in which for some ele:E, p
. e l
that the experiment is inefficient since we may very well end
ｾ ｰ ｾ ｩ ｴ ｨ the same posterior probability distribution as our
prior distribution. If p is not too different from Po then
e l
the experiment will remain inefficient. How close it has to
be for inefficiency is made precise by the corollary.
The second condition is more difficult to interpret,
Ｈ Ｍ ｾ ｳ Ｈ ］ ｮ ｴ ｪ ｡ ｬ ｬ ｹ it js 8. question of dimensionality brought in by
the finiteness of the set S.
EventuJ.lly, experiments should be compared in terms of
EVIls. Th1s comparison is easily facilitated for efficient
experiments since then they may be partially ordered indepen-
dently of the particular decision problem in the P-class.
Definition 2.2.5
-8-
An experiment El is said to be more
informative than an experiment E2 if and only if for all
problems ln the P-class,
Proposition 2.2.6 For an efficient experiment El to
be more informative than an experiment E2 , a necessary and
sufficient condition is that PE C PE .2 1
Proof: As a simple property of the Cav operator, PEe.. PE2 1
is equivalent to
for all convex functions f(-) on P.. Since (2.3.1) is an
equality for efficient experiments the proposition follows. I I
We shall conclude this section showing how the comparison
of experiments in extensive form is related to their comparison
in normal form. The parallel of this presentation with Blackwell
and Girshick' s study on the sUbj ect [B-G] will become apparent.
Proposition 2.2.7 For any experiment E, the vectors
{Pe}eEE are linearly independent if and only if the vectors
(q'e = (qes) eES) eEE are linearly independent.
Proo£': Denote by R the matrix {ps} and by T the matrix
e eEE,sES
s ｾ
= pe. Ae for alI (e , s) in Ex S .
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According to Bayes theorem
q - Prob (s/e) Prob (e)/Prob (s)es -
Since for all (e,s) In ExS Ｌｾ > 0 and s > 0 th t1\ p, e vec ors
e 0
{Pe}e£E are independent if and only if the vectors {te}e£E
are independent ana the vectors' {t} E are independent ife e£
and only if the vectors {q} E are independeht. I Ie e£
We may thus replace the set {Pe}e£E by the set {qe}e£E
in our development. In particular we obtain that an experiment
,
El is more informative than an experiment E2 if the vectors
{q} E are linearly dependent on the vectors {qe} E
e e£ 2 e£ 1·
This result was derived directly by Blackwell and Girshick for
experiments in normal form, hence the equivalence of the two
approaches.
3. An Illustrative Example
The following simple examwle illustrates the concepts
developed in the paper. The data corresponds to example 1.4.3
in [R-S].
3.1 The Classical Problem
I
, ,
u(sl' a2) = u(s2' a 2) = 0
Then the optimal action is a 2
,
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3.2 The Experiment .in Extensive Form (see definition 2.1.3)
E = {el , e 2, e 3}, p = ( .9, .1) , p = (.75, .25), Pe = (.3, .7)e l e 2 3
* * .*
Al = .6 A2 = . 3 A3 = .1, ,
* .* *(Note that A Pe + A2 P + A3 Pe should equal PO· Indeed,1 1 e 2 3
.6 x .9 + .3 x .75 + .1 x . 3 = .795 ｾ . 8
.6 x .1 + . 3 x .25 + .1 x . 7 = .205 ｾ .2
and so the data corresponds only approximately to an experiment).
3.3 The Analysis (see the diagram)
There are more points in E than in S, thus by corollary
2.2.4 the experiment is inefficient. We can modify the
marginal distribution so that
ａ ｾ = 5/6 , ａｾ = 0 , ａｾ = 1/6
(AO is computed so that ａ ｾ Pel + ａｾ Pe
3
= PO)
The resulting experiment EO is clearly efficient and PE = P 0E
Thus using proportion 2.3.1, both for the original and the
modified experiments, we obtain
(PO IE) ｾ * *EVI Cav u (PO) -. u (PO)
PE
and
EVI (POIEO) * *= Cav u (Po) - u (Po)
PE
* * *= 5/6 u (Pe ) + 1/6 u (p ) u (Po)
1 e 3
= 5/6 x 0 + 1/6 C.3 X (-100) + .7x(350)] - 0
ｾ 36
-lJ-
5= 52 5;: 5,
350 350
300 300
""",,/U.
200 200
I
I
I
I
100 I 100
I
Cav U·( po) - u·( Po) ｾ 36I
I PEI
.3 I
Pe Prob ( 5 =51 )'
I
Pe
Pe2 Po-100 3 ·100
DIAGRAM: AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
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and so EVI(poIE) < 36.
This upperbound may be compared with the upperbound assuming
perfect information which is found to be 70 (.2 x 350). An
exact computation yields an expected value of information of
approximately 25.
4. Prac:ti,;::al'Implications
Thu Blidy of experiments in extensive form leads us to the
may nov\}' be .used to somewhat simplify the decision ［ ｊ Ｌ ｮ Ｒ Ｑ Ｌ ｙ Ｓ ｩ ｲ ｾ at'
ｰ ｲ ｡ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｡ ｬ :::;'1. tua tions in the follovJing. ways:
(i) If one has to select one and only une ･ ｸ ｰ ｾ ｲ ｩ ｭ ･ ｮ ｴ
freHa 3 given set of equally costly ｴ ｾ ｪ ｱ ｊ ｯ ｟ Ｍ Ｚ ｃ ｬ ［ Ｚ Ｌ ﾷ ..:n'(,;", then
]JI'cpos5 tion 2.2.6 may be used '13 a dominar:,.:;: c:c·ij ｴ Ｚ Ａ Ｚ Ｇ ｾ ｯ ｮ
to delete less informative experiments. (see
(ii)
section 6-4 in [S] for general comments on the sUbj ect) .
If '..'ne has to design an experiment then cffici·:::nt
expuriments have clearly some advantag8s (in
principle one may "redesign" an inefficient eXlJ<2rinent
so as to obtain an efficient one by ffioiifying ｾ ｨ ･
the mar;ginal probabilities), and then corollary 2.2.4
offers guidelines. Moreover the marginal probability
distribution need not be specified for efficient
experiments since it is uniquely determined by the
requirement
"A* P
e e = Po
,'.', Ｇ ｾ Ｎ Ｇ Ｍ Ｍ Ｎ ｾ Ｇ Ｎ
-13-
(iii) If one has to evaluate an inefficient experiment
then proposition 2.2.1 gives an upperbound for the
EVI. (In this sense it is an improvement over the
well known inequality EVI < EVPI (perfect information)).
ｔ ｾ ･ ｾ the knowledge of an upperbound for the EVI may
enable the analyst to cut off some branch in a
decision tree.
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